This paper studies coalition formation among selfinterested agents that cannot make sidepayments. We show that -core stability reduces to analyzing whether some utility pro le is maximal for all agents. We also show that the -core is a subset of strong Nash equilibria. This fact carries our stability results directly over to three strategic solution concepts. The main focus of the paper is on analyzing the dynamic process of coalition formation by explicitly modeling the costs of communication and deliberation. We describe an algorithm for sequential action choice where each agent greedily maximizes its stepwise payo given its beliefs. Conditions are derived under which this process leads to convergence of the agents' beliefs and to a stable coalition structure (when the length of the process is exogenously restricted as well as when agents can choose it). Finally, we show that the outcome of any communication-deliberation process that leads to a stable coalition structure is Pareto-optimal for the original game that does not incorporate communication or deliberation. Conversely, any Pareto-optimal outcome can be supported by a communication-deliberation process that leads to a stable coalition structure.
Introduction
In many multiagent settings, self-interested agents|e.g. representing real-world companies or individuals|can operate more e ectively by forming coalitions and coordinating their activities within each coalition. Therefore, e cient methods for coalition formation are of key importance in multiagent systems. Coalition formation involves partitioning the agents into disjoint coalitions, solving the coordination problem within each coalition,
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Coalition formation among self-interested agents has been widely studied in game theory 9; 5; 2; 1; 3; 4]. The main solution concepts are geared toward guaranteeing forms of stability of the coalition structure. These concepts focus on the nal solution, and they usually do not address the dynamic process that leads to that solution. Recent DAI work on coalition formation has introduced protocols for dynamic coalition formation, but the process and the agents' strategies in that process have not been included in the solution concept. In other words, although the outcomes satisfy di erent forms of stability, it is often not guaranteed that the process itself is stable or that individual agents should adhere to that process 7; 8] . Also, it is often implicitly assumed that agents can carry out intractable computations 10; 7; 8] . On the other hand, recent DAI work has sometimes addressed the computational limitations by explicitly incorporating computational actions in the solution concept 6]. This allows one to game theoretically trade o computation cost against solution quality. However, that work did not include protocols for dynamic coalition formation, and it did not address belief revision. This paper studies self-interested agents with a special focus on the sequential deliberation (computation) and communication actions that the agents take in the dynamic process of coalition formation. Section 2 introduces the classic framework of game theoretic coalition formation for agents that cannot make sidepayments. Section 3 analyses outcomes statically with the -core solution concept. Section 4 shows generally that results derived under the -core solution concept carry over directly to strategic solution concepts such as the Nash equilibrium, the strong Nash equilibrium, and the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Section 5 introduces the dynamic coalition formation process which incorporates deliberation and communication. It shows, among other results, that stability of the coalition formation process is formally equivalent to convergence of the agents' beliefs (for both exogenously and endogenously terminated negotiation), and also that the outcome is Pareto-optimal.
Games and Solutions
This section reviews the concept of a coalition game and an approach for de ning the value of a coalition (characteristic function) in games where nonmembers' actions a ect the value of the coalition, and agents cannot transfer sidepayments. We begin by de ning a game.
De nition 1 A game G = ((S i ) n i=1 ; U) is such that I = f1; : : :; ng is the set of players, S i the set of strategies for each i 2 I and U : Q n i=1 S i ! R n , such that for each (s 1 ; : : :; s n ) 2 Q n i=1 S i , U(s 1 ; : : :; s n ) = (u 1 (s 1 ; : : :; s n ); : : :; u n (s 1 ; : : :; s n ))
given the individual utilities on strategies: for each i, u i :
A solution concept de nes the reasonable ways that a game can be played by self-interested agents:
De nition 2 Given a game G = ((S i ) n i=1 ; U), a solution concept (in pure strategies) 1 is a correspondence : G ! Q n i=1 S i ;, and each s = (s 1 ; : : :; s n ) 2 (G) is called a solution of G An example of solution concept is given by Nash equilibria: for each game G they are elements of N (G), where N is the Nash correspondence. 2 The range of a correspondence includes the empty set in order to encompass games that do not have a solution of the type prescribed by the solution concept.
De nition 1 characterizes games in terms of the strategies of agents and the corresponding payo s. These games are said to be in normal form. The normal form is a general representation that can be used to model the fact that nonmembers' actions a ect the value of the coalition 6; 4]. However, coalition formation has been mostly studied in a strict subset of normal form games|characteristic function games|where the value of a coalition does not depend on nonmembers' actions, and it can therefore be represented by a coalition speci c characteristic function which provides a payo for each coalition T (i.e. set of agents) 9; 5; 10; 7; 8]. Characteristic functions are a desirable representation, so one would like to de ne such mathematical entities also for normal form games. In such general games, a characteristic function can only be de ned by making speci c assumptions about nonmembers' strategies. In this paper we follow Aumann's classic approach of making the -assumption, i.e. assuming that nonmembers pick strategies that are worst for the coalition. Each coalition can locally guarantee itself a payo that is no 1 This notion of solution can be easily extended to mixed strategies, replacing each Si by Si, the set of probability distributions on Si. less than the one prescribed by an analysis under this pessimistic assumption. 3 Later in the paper we show that the results that we obtain under the -assumption carry over to strategic solution concepts that can be used directly in normal form games without any assumptions about nonmembers' strategies.
In games where agents can make sidepayments to each other 7; 8; 6; 5], the characteristic function gives the sum of the payo s of the agents in a coalition. Instead, our analysis focuses on games where agents cannot make sidepayments. In such games, the characteristic function gives a set of utility vectors that are achievable 2]. This is in order to provide the coalition with a set of alternative utility divisions among member agents. The set contains only Pareto-optimal utility vectors: no agent can be made better o without making some other agent worse o . The next de nition formalizes this vector valued characteristic function under the -assumption. The blocking relation de nes a particular set of stable joint strategies, the -core. The -core is the set of joint strategies where no coalition can be formed such that its members are better o changing their individual strategies, given that nonmembers pick strategies that are worst for the coalition. In other words, it is the set of joint strategies for which a stable collective agreement can be reached. Formally, the -core correspondence is de ned as follows:
De nition 6 A s = (s 1 ; : : :; s n ) is in the -core C if there is no coalition T that can block (s 1 ; : : :; s n ).
As with the Nash correspondence, the -core correspondence can be empty for some games: Under what conditions does a stable coalition structure exist, i.e., what are the conditions for the nonemptyness of the -core? In the rest of this section we will show that surprisingly simple conditions are necessary and su cient for stability. The concept of superadditivity will be used to build an intuition of this phenomenon. Superadditivity implies that any two coalitions are best o merging.
De nition 7 A game G is superadditive if given any two coalitions T 1 ; T 2 , T 1 \ T 2 = ;, v (T 1 ) \ v (T 2 ) v (T 1 T 2 ). 4 We now show an interesting property that relates the characteristic functions and superadditivity. This condition on characteristic functions will be later used to discuss stability. 
Relationships between Axiomatic and Strategic Solution Concepts
In this section we present some new relationships between axiomatic and strategic (normative) solution concepts. The importance of these relationships lies in the fact that they allow us to import the other results of this paper (derived for the axiomatic -core solution concept) directly to normative solution concepts. The notion of the -core is axiomatic in that it only characterizes the outcome without a direct reference to strategic behavior. The Nash correspondence is, instead, a strategic solution concept: it is based only on the selfinterested strategy choices of agents. Speci cally, it analyzes what an agent's best strategy is, given the strategies of others. A strategy pro le is in Nash equilibrium if every agent's strategy is a best response to the strategies of the others. Nash equilibrium does not account for the possibility that groups of agents (coalitions) can change their strategies in a coordinated manner. Aumann has introduced a strategic solution concept called the strong Nash equilibrium to address this issue 2]:
De nition 8 A strategy pro le s 2 Q n i=1 S i , in a game G, is a strong Nash equilibrium if for any T I and for all s T 2 Q j2T S j there exists an i 0 2 T such that u i0 (s) u i0 ( s T ; s I?T ).
This concept gives rise to the strong Nash correspondence, SN , i.e. the set of strong Nash equilibria. We can show a close relationship between the strong Nash solution concept and the -core solution concept: Theorem 2 For any game G, C (G) SN (G). 5 Proof 2 Suppose that s 2 C (G) but s 6 2 SN (G). One implication of the results in this section is that the other results of this paper (which are derived for the -core) carry over directly to analyses that use strategic solution concepts (Nash equilibrium, coalition-proof Nash equilibrium or strong Nash equilibrium). Specically, any solution that is stable according to the -core is also stable according to these three solution concepts.
Another implication is that to verify that a strategy pro le is in the -core, one only needs to consider strategy pro les that are Pareto-optimal 6 and in Nash equilibrium. Alternatively, one can restrict this search to 5 Often the strong Nash equilibrium is too strong a solution concept, because in many games no such equilibrium exists. Recently, the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium 3] has been suggested as a partial remedy to this problem. This solution concept requires that there is no subgroup that can make a mutually bene cial deviation (keeping the strategies of nonmembers xed) in a way that the deviation itself is stable according to the same criterion. A conceptual problem with this solution concept is that the deviation may be stable within the deviating group, but the solution concept ignores the possibility that some of the agents that deviated may prefer to deviate again with agents that did not originally deviate. Furthermore, even this kinds of solutions do not exist in all games. In games where a solution is stable according to the -core, the solution is stable according to the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium solution concept also. This is because C (G) CPN (which follows from our result C (G) SN (G) and the known fact SN (G) CPN (G)). 6 The non-emptyness of the -core is equivalent to the existence of an utility vector U which is common to all sets v (fig) for all Ui for all i, with strict inequality for at least one i. That is, U is Paretooptimal. Therefore one can restrict the search to Paretooptimal outcomes.
Pareto-optimal strong Nash or Pareto-optimal coalitionproof Nash equilibria.
Bounded Rationality in Coalition Formation
In the previous section it was assumed that deliberation is costless. 
t < N, a t i = a ti i
The idea behind this de nition is that the agents deliberate and exchange messages until each one decides on a strategy to follow. We also assume that this process is nite and that each agent stays commited to her choice once she has reached a decision.
We use a very general characterization of the communication-deliberation process, without going into the details of how an action leads to another one (e.g. how deliberation actions lead to the choice of physical actions). This approach has the advantage of providing results that can be applied to any such process. We say that the payo of agent i in an N-period process is determined as follows: We assume that costs of activities are independent, so if the process isâ i = (a De nition 12 From G, fD i g n i=1 and t > 0, a new game can be de ned, G t = ((D t i S i ) n i=1 ; P), where P :
Q n i=1 (D t i S i ), P(â) = ( 1 (â 1 ); : : :; n (â n )) The length of the game, t, depends critically on the available communication-deliberation activities and on the sequential choice of activities. We assume that the time limit is a given. To justify this, we suppose that each agent i has a degree of impatience, given by a maximum time to make a nal decision t i . In Subsection 5.2 we will relax this assumption.
In order to maximize payo s, our self-interested agents engage in negotiations. The nal outcomes represent the result of agreements among agents. To justify the selfenforcement of these agreements we need a criterion for the stability of the coalition structure: ; sg is a process in which T is formed and obtains s, where s j = s j and P j (â 0 ) P j (â), for j 2 T. Contradiction becauseâ is in the -core of G t 2 We can easily restate the notions given in Section 2 in order to nd conditions for the stability of the coalition structure. First, we de ne the characteristic function for G t , v G t , replacing the optimal achievable utilities by the optimal achievable payo s which incorporate deliberation and communication:
De nition 14 Given G t = ((D t i S i ) n i=1 ; P), and T I, the set of optimal achievable payo s for T = fj 1 ; : : :; j jTj g is the set of Ps such that existsâ 2 Q n i=1 (D t i S i ) and P(â) = P. Moreover, 6 9â 2 Q n i=1 (D t i S i ), such that P(â) = P 0 with, for all j i 2 T, P 0 ji P ji , and for at least one j 2 T, P 0 j > P j This means, again, that P is an optimal achievable payo for coalition T if there is no other payo vector such that the payo is no worse for any member and it is better for at least one|for all (in particular for the worst) processes that nonmembers can pick. Now, Proposition 3â 2 is higher than any other payo , considering that d is an unavoidable step in the process. If an agent chooses the process fd; ncg she know that the other will do the same, so the payo will be 2 ? 0:1.
Incorporating Belief Revision
The previous example is very simple, but it shows the sequential nature of an agent's choice of action. This subsection introduces a more sophisticated decision making model for an agent that takes part in coalition formation. This model is used to show results on the joint outcomes and the joint process.
To choose the action that maximizes expected payo at each step, an agent may need to evaluate the expected payo s of di erent actions. We will show when this procedure leads to the formation of a stable coalition structure. To give a mathematical characterization, we introduce the notion of \expected payo ":
De nition 15 Given a sequence of actions performed by an agent i,â t i = (a 0 i ; : : :; a t i ) 2 D t+1 i , we say that agent i can de ne a subjective probability distribution on Q n i=1 S i , such that t i (sja t+1 i ) is the conditional probability of an outcome s, given that the next action is a t+1 i . A probability distribution on the total costs associated with the process to reach s 2 Q n i=1 S i can be also de ned, such that t i (C i (s)ja t+1 i ) is the conditional probability of a cost C i (s) 7 , given that the next action is a t+1 i . Then, the expected payo , given that the next action is a t+1 i is
An agent can try to maximize her expected payo in each step, i.e. to choose a a t i 2 (D i S i ) that maximizes t i ( ). This is a greedy procedure, and agents that use it may not always converge on a joint solution. But when this procedure is performed in conjunction with coordination among agents (in the sense that they agree on a process that is in the -core), they will converge to the belief that a particular outcome s is the most probable one (later we show that s is Pareto-optimal). The converse is not true. A process that leads to a stable coalition structure may not be in the -core. It is intuitive that a stable structure can be formed in a cost-ine cient process. This process could be blocked by another one leading to the same coalition structure, thus preserving stability. Therefore, Proposition 4 only gives a necessary condition for a process to be an element of the -core. However, this is all we need since the following result shows that a coalition structure is stable if it leads to a convergence of beliefs about the strategy pro le to be chosen. i (C i ( )j ) achieve a maximum and a minimum 2 Put together, Theorem 5 gives the conditions under which the greedy process of De nition 15 is guaranteed to lead to a stable coalition structure. Sometimes the process that leads to this coalition structure is stable according to the -core and sometimes not.
Deliberation-Communication Processes of Di erent Lengths
The previous result is highly dependent on the length of the process: two processesâ andâ 0 are comparable only if their lengths are the same. If not, the previous result cannot be applied. If we maintain that the degree of impatience of each agent, t i , is given beforehand, it is clear that the game has a de nite length max i2I t i . If not, a condition on the convergence of beliefs can be given. The following result shows also that every convergent process (in the sense that agents agree in their beliefs about the nal outcome), de nes a stable coalition structure in an endogenously de ned timing. In other words, there always exists a process that provides the outcome on which the agents agree, and the length of the process is nite: Communication-deliberation processes were introduced in order to describe the dynamic formation of coalition structures in the original game G. Theorem 7 shows that the outcome of a process that converges to a stable coalition structure is Pareto-optimal (part of the Paretofrontier of the original game G). Conversely, any Paretooptimal outcome can be supported by a process that converges to a stable coalition structure. 
Conclusions
We analyzed the problem of coalition formation in games without sidepayments. First, the -core solution concept was reviewed in the context of games in which agents are 8 There is an analogy between this result and the Folk theorems for repeated games 4] . Both show that the outcome of a process lies in a particular region of the strategy space: above the minimax point in the Folk result and the Paretofrontier here.
perfectly rational. We showed that a solution is in thecore if the corresponding utility pro le is Pareto-optimal, i.e. an individual utility cannot be improved without diminishing the utility of another agent. This property is closely related with superadditivity, a property indicating that shared optimal achievable utilities for di erent coalitions remain optimal achievable utilities for the union of the coalitions. Superadditivity implies that any two coalitions are best o by merging.
Next we explored the relationships between axiomatic and strategic solution concepts. We showed that any solution that is stable according to the -core corresponds to a strong Nash equilibrium (and to a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and a Nash equilibrium). This allows us to study games with the -core solution concept while our positive stability results carry over directly to these three strategic equilibrium-based solution concepts. This also allows one to con ne the search for stable -core solutions to the space of Pareto-e cient strong Nash equilibria (or coalition-proof Nash equilibria or Nash equilibria).
For bounded rational agents we showed that the -core solution concept provides clues about the properties of the deliberation-communication processes that lead to stable coalition structures. Speci cally, we showed that a process de nes a stable coalition structure if its outcome cannot be blocked by a coalition formed in another process of the same length.
We characterized the communication-deliberation process as a greedy maximization of stepwise expected payo where deliberation and communication actions incur costs. We showed that when agents agree to a process that is in the -core, this greedy algorithm leads to convergence of the agents' beliefs in a nite number of steps. We also showed that the convergence of beliefs implies that the nal outcome is stable (when the protocol length is exogenously restricted as well as when agents can endogenously decide the length). More general mathematical conditions for such stability were also derived.
Finally, we showed that the outcome of any communication-deliberation process that leads to a stable coalition structure is Pareto-optimal for the original game that does not incorporate communication or deliberation. Conversely, any Pareto-optimal outcome can be supported by a communication-deliberation process that leads to a stable coalition structure.
